

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0338

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF
JUNE 13, 1978

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JUNE 13, 1978 INFORMAL SESSION OF THE
VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE BELGIAN,
FRG AND US REPS AND THE EAST BY SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND
SHSUTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK REP KEBLUSEK AND GDR REP OESER. MILITARY
ADVISORS WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. DURING THE SESSION, WESTERN REPS RESPONDED TO AN EARLIER
EASTERN CRITICISM OF THE WEST'S APRIL 19 PROPOSALS, ASKED A
NUMBER OF QUESTION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, ANSWERED
SOME QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA AND PUT FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE
EAST ON EASTERN DATA. EASTERN REPS FURTHER EXPLAINED THE MERITS

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OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS AND RESPONDED TO MOST
WESTERN QUESTIONS ON THEM.

3. EASTERN REPS WERE IN GENERAL FORTHCOMING IN THEIR REPLIES
AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW POINTS EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION.
ALONG THESE WERE: (1) THE EAST EXPECTS NON-US
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE IN A

PHASE I AGREEMENT TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II. (2) THE STARTING POINT FOR REDUCTIONS, THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS FOR EACH SIDE, WOULD HAVE TO BE UPDATED PRIOR TO AN AGREEMENT. (3) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A 900,000 OVERALL CEILING AND 700,000 CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ENVISAGED A FIXED LIMIT OF 200,000 FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER RATHER THAN A LIMIT WHICH COULD INCREASE ABOUT 200,000 IF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DROPPED BELOW 700,000 AS PROVIDED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THIS AIR FORCE MANPOWER CEILING WOULD BE COLLECTIVE. (4) IT WAS UNCLEAR FROM EASTERN REPLIES AS TO WHETHER UNIT LIMITS WOULD APPLY TO UNITS OF A FUNCTIONAL TYPE (I.E. MECHANIZED INFANTRY OR ENGINEER BATTALIONS) REDUCED BY EITHER SIDE OR TO ALL UNITS OF THE SIZE REDUCED, THAT IS, DIVISIONS, REGIMENTS, BATTALIONS, OR SMALLER. (5) ASIDE FROM THE THREE SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, DISPOSAL OF THE ARMAMENTS OF US UNITS WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DECISION BY US AUTHORITIES. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO THE ARMAMENTS OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES ASIDE FROM MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES. (6) TARASOV WAS VAGUE AS TO WHAT THE EAST MEANT IN SAYING THAT THE PATTERN OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PATTERN OF US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I. HE DID SPECIFY THAT THE EAST HAD IN MIND A "PACKAGE" OF SPECIFIC ARMAMENTS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO THE "PACKAGE" NOW BEING PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR PHASE I US AND SOVIET ARMAMENT

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REDUCTIONS. (7) HE CONFIRMED THAT ACCORDING TO THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL, BOTH THE US AND USSR COULD UNILATERALLY NULLIFY THE ENTIRE PHASE I AGREEMENT INCLUDING PHASE I REDUCTIONS, RETURNING THE SITUATION TO THE STARTING POINT, IF THE PATTERN OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY NON-US AND NON-SOVIET DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT CONFORM TO THE PHASE I "PATTERN." (8) TARASOV ADMITTED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS PROPOSED ON THE MEMBERS OF EACH ALLIANCE AS REGARDS THEIR CAPACITY TO COMPENSATE FOR UNILATERAL POST-REDUCTION REDUCTIONS BY ONE OF THEIR ALLIES COULD RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE A GIVEN SIDE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RESTORE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ITS FORCES TO THE PERMITTED LEVEL. (9) TARASOV WAS VAGUE ABOUT WHAT TYPE OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE ARMED FORCES THE EAST HAD IN MIND FREEZING UNDER ITS NEW PROPOSALS.

4. FOLLOWING ARE THE SECTIONS OF THE DISCUSSION WHICH RELATE TO THE NEW EASTERN INITIATIVE. FULL TEXT, WHICH MAY INCORPORATE MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES, WILL BE SENT BY AIRGRAM.

5. GDR REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THAT, IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF 8 JUNE 1978, EASTERN REPS HAD SUBMITTED NEW PROPOSALS IMPORTANT IN

PRINCIPLE PROVIDING A REAL AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE PRESENT INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO EXPLAIN IN MORE DETAIL SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THESE PROPOSALS, IN THE FIRST LINE, THOSE ASPECTS CONNECTED WITH REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST PHASE, AS WELL AS THE COMMITMENTS OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST PHASE.

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6. GDR REP SAID EASTERN REPS WISHED TO STRESS ABOVE ALL THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, WHEN ELABORATING THE NEW PROPOSALS, HAD TIRED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN STATES AND TO AS GREAT AN EXTENT AS POSSIBLE. ALREADY WHEN STUDYING THE CONTENT OF THE EAST'S NEW INITIATIVE FOR THE FIRST TIME, ONE MIGHT EASILY CONVINCE ONESELF OF THIS POINT. AS COULD BE SEEN FROM POINT 1 OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, THESE PROPOSALS AGREED, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW, TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS IN TWO PHASES, WHEREBY, IN THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH WOULD LAST FOR ONE YEAR, ONLY THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION

AND THE USA WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.

7. GDR REP SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN INSISTING SO FAR THAT NOT ONLY GROUND FORCE, BUT ALSO
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AIR FORCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE REDUCED, THEY WERE NOW READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXPLICIT WISHES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE USA AND OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONFINED TO GROUND FORCES. THIS WAS DOUBTEDLESS A MAJOR MOVE OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS MEETING THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. GDR REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS FURTHER PROVIDED THAT, IN THE FIRST STAGE, THE USSR WOULD REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES BY APPROXIMATELY 30,000 MEN AND THE USA BY APPROXIMATELY 14,000 MEN, THIS WOULD MEAN, BY 7 PERCENT OF THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH OF THESE STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS ASPECT OF THE NEW PROPOSALS ALSO TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION WISHES EXPRESSED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES. AS WAS KNOWN, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF FEB 19, 1976 FOR THE FIRST PHASE ENVISAGED AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA PROCEEDING FROM THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE SCOPE OF THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL. THIS POSITION OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED FROM THE ANGLE OF SAFEGUARDING THEIR SECURITY, THE MORE SO SINCE THE NATO COUNTRIES HAD UNTIL RECENTLY REFUSED TO PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEES FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA IN REDUCTIONS. THEY HAD MERELY PROMISED TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SECOND PHASE FOR HIGH, BY THE WAY, NO TIME LIMITS HAD BEEN FIXED. TO SPEED UP AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD NOW DECIDED TO STATE THEIR CONSENT AS TO CARRYING THROUGH EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES PROCEEDING FROM THEIR NATIONAL LEVELS AND NOT FROM THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES
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OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN OTHER WORDS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO REDUCE TWICE AS MANY SOVIET FORCES AS AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE FIRST PHASE. APPROXIMATELY THE SAME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AMOUNTS OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET

FORCES WHICH WOULD BE REDUCED HAD BEEN PROVIDED FOR IN THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

9. GDR REP SAID THAT A CORRECTION (COMMENT: CHANGE) OF THE POSITION OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ON THIS QUESTION HAD BECOME POSSIBLE BECAUSE IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL, THE WEST HAD STATED THE READINESS OF ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES AND CANADA TO PARTICIPATE BY REDUCING THEIR FORCES AND TO CARRY THROUGH THESE REDUCTIONS IN PREVIOUSLY AGREED TERMS. IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION, THE QUANTITATIVELY LARGE REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES AS COMPARED TO AMERICAN FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE BECAME A TEMPORARY, SHORT TERM FACTOR WHICH DID NOT ESSENTIALLY AFFECT THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE SECURITY OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. MOREOVER, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE MAKING THEIR AGREEMENT TO SUCH REDUCTIONS DEPENDENT ON THE STIPULATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS FOR ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE EASTERN REPS WITH A CHANCE TO KNOW HOW MANY FORCES EACH WESTERN EUROPEAN STATE AND CANADA WAS GOING TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE AND WHEN THIS WOULD BE.

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10. GDR REP SAID THAT, AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVERN

EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR SHOULD BE REDUCED BY 68,000 MEN AND THOSE OF THE USA BY 29,000. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED FIGURES HAD BEEN CHOSEN VERY ARBITRARILY BY THE WEST AND, AS REGARDS THE FIGURE OF 68,000 MEN FOR THE USSR, THIS NUMBER WAS IN ANY EVEN EXTREMELY HIGH AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH A MUTUAL OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTIONS.

11. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE WESTERN REPS THAT, WHEN SIGNING AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST PHASE, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD EXCHANGE LISTS CONTAINING THE ACTUAL DESIGNATION, NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE LARGE UNITS AND SUB-UNITS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION. THIS AGREEMENT
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HAD BEEN STATED IN POINT 5 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS.

12. GDR REP SAID THAT POINTS 2 AND 3 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS STATED THEIR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FIRST PHASE. UNDER THESE REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW 1,000 TANKS AND 250 COMBAT VEHICLES OF THE INFANTRY, WHILE THE USA WOULD REDUCE 1,000 NUCLEAR MEANS (COMMENT: WARHEADS); 36 PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS; AND 54 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT. AS REGARDS THIS QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE ALSO MOVING IN A CONSIDERABLE WAY TO MEET WESTERN WISHES. WESTERN REPS KNEW THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SO FAR HAD PROCEEDED FROM APPROXIMATELY EQUAL KINDS AND TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED. ON EACH SIDE THEY HAD ENVISAGED THE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF TANKS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, MISSILE LAUNCHERS, ETC. AS WAS KNOWN, THE WEST HAD NOT AGREED TO THIS APPROACH WHICH, IN THE EAST'S CONVICTION, WAS DEFINITELY EQUITABLE. IN ORDER TO SPEED UP THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THEIR NEW PROPOSALS HAD DECIDED TO MEET THE WISHES OF THE WESTERN STATES AS REGARDS THE SELECTIVE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF ARMAMENTS IN THE FIRST PHASE.

13. GDR REP SAID THAT EASTERN REPS EXPECTED THIS PROOF OF EASTERN GOOD WILL TO BE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD AND ASSESSED BY THE WEST. EASTERN REPS ALSO WANTED TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE WESTERN REPS TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD STATED ITS READINESS, IN ADDITION TO THE REDUCTION OF 1,000 TANKS, TO ALSO WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTION AREA 250 COMBAT VEHICLES OF THE INFANTRY WITHOUT DEMANDING A REDUCTION OF THE SAME KIND OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE.

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14. GDR REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ALSO AGREED TO ESTABLISH SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS FOR THOSE KINDS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMAMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE WEST IN ITS PROPOSAL OF 19 APRIL 1978.

15. GDR REP SAID THAT IN POINT 2 THE EAST HAD ALSO EXPRESSED ITS READINESS TO CARRY THROUGH REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE IN THE WAY WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN SIDE. THAT IS, IN DIVISIONS FORMING THE MAIN KIND OF LARGE UNITS OF THE SOVIET ARMY. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES HAD TO BE CARRIED THROUGH BY ALL PARTICIPANTS TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY, EQUALITY, AND OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL SIDES, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS INSISTED THAT ALSO THE REDUCTION OF THE US ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE CARRIED THROUGH IN LARGE UNITS, THAT IS IN BRIGADES. THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT AGREE TO AN APPROACH OF THE KIND WHEREBY, IN REPLY TO THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET DIVISIONS, THE US WOULD WITHDRAW FROM CENTRAL EUROPE MERELY SMALL UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OR, RESPECTIVELY, INDIVIDUAL MILITARY PERSONNEL SELECTIVELY TAKEN.

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16. GDR REP SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ON 8 JUNE 1978 THUS FORMED A GOOD BASIS AS REGARDS THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, EQUITABLE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF USSR AND USA FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE. BY THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE THE USSR AND THE USA WOULD AT THE SAME TIME MAKE A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS AREA, THUS ESTABLISHING A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE FOR THE OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17 CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, AS EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY NOTED, THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS PRESERVED A PROVISION WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE EASTERN APPROACH. THAT IS, THAT ALL STATES WHICH WERE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WITH EACH OF THEM BEING OBLIGATED TO MAKE

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AN INDIVIDUAL AND EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. THIS WAS REFLECTED PARTICULARLY IN POINTS 6 AND 7 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE 1978. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO EXPLAIN THESE POINTS IN MORE DETAIL. IN CONCRETE TERMS, THEY MEANT THAT, IN THE TEXT OF THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THERE SHOULD BE EMBODIED, BESIDES DETAILED OBLIGATIONS OF THE USSR AND USA REFERRED TO ABOVE, ALSO THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS: FIRST, PRECISE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THE USSR AND THE USA THAT THEY WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE. SECOND, A CONCRETE AMOUNT OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY EACH OF THESE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND STAGE. THIRD, AN INDICATION THAT THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND STAGE, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CONCRETE KINDS AND TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY THEM WOULD BE AGREED UPON IN THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS. FOURTH, THE PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH STAGE 2 REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE THAT IS, THREE TO FOUR YEARS FROM THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE STAGE 1 AGREEMENT.

18. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ATTACHED GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THESE ASPECTS SHOULD BE EMBODIED IN THE STAGE 1 AGREEMENT, SINCE THEY ENSURED A CLOSE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES, CONFIRMING THE REAL READINESS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE THEIR PROPORTIONATE CONTRIBUTION

TO THE REDUCTIONS AND TO GUARANTEE THAT THESE REDUCTIONS
WOULD BE MUTUAL, COMPARABLE, AND EQUIVALENT, AND THAT
THEY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME.
EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE UNDERTAKING
OF INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS BY THE OTHER STATES
WHICH WERE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT
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AT ALL PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF
REDUCTIONS OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND THE NATO
STATES, A POINT ON WHICH THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED
IN THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS, THUS MAKING A SIGNIFICANT MOVE TOWARDS
MEETING THE WESTERN SIDE'S WISHES IN THIS MAJOR ISSUE.

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19. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT THE QUOTE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER
UNQUOTE OF THE LEVELS APPLIED TO THE MECHANISM FOR THEIR
MAINTENANCE AND REGULATION AFTER REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN CARRIED

OUT. HOWEVER, THESE LEVELS MUST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ONLY EQUIVALENT OBLIGATIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHEN THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THEM, IN THE FIRST OR THE SECOND STAGE, WOULD SECURE AN EQUAL OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS FOR ALL. ATTEMPTS TO ENSURE COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS FOR A GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE VERY PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS MIGHT IN FACT AMOUNT TO EFFORTS AIMED AT FINDING CERTAIN OUTLETS WHICH WOULD PREVENT ONE OR ANOTHER STAGE TO LESSEN THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS REDUCTIONS AND THUS TO SECURE FOR ITSELF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

20. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL 1978, IN ENVISAGING THAT IN THE
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PHASE I AGREEMENT THERE SHOULD BE SPECIFIED THE OVERALL TOTAL OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE 2 BY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND BY THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTIVELY, ALTHOUGH THEY REPRESENTED A CERTAIN STEP FORWARD AS COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS WESTERN POSITION, DID NOT BY FAR TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE JUST WISHES OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE AN INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. THE OBLIGATIONS PROPOSED BY THE WEST WERE VERY VAGUE. THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE REDUCING A CONSIDERABLE PART OF ITS FORCES ALREADY IN THE FIRST STAGE, WOULD NOT KNOW, EVEN IN A GENERAL FORM, WHEN REDUCTION OF FORCES WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND STAGE.

21. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT AGREE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY THE UK REP IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF 24 MAY 1978 THAT QUOTE THE INTERNAL COMPOSITION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN REDUCTIONS CANNOT BECOME A SUBJECT FOR EAST/WEST NEGOTIATION. UNQUOTE. SUCH A STATEMENT COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS EQUITABLE, EITHER FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF LOGIC OR FROM THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. IN THE COURSE OF THE VIENNA DISCUSSIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY POINTED TO THE UNFOUNDEDNESS OF THESE ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN REPS TO INSIST ON THE UNDERTAKING OF COMPLETELY DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS QUOTE INDIVIDUAL ONES UNQUOTE, FOR ONE GROUP OF STATES, THE USSR AND THE USA AND QUOTE COLLECTIVE UNQUOTE ONES FOR THE OTHER STATES, IN PARTICULAR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA. THE EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT IT WAS ILLOGICAL TO MAKE REFERENCES TO THE INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM OF NATO SINCE THE US FORCES ALSO FORM A PART OF THAT SYSTEM IN THE SAME WAY AS THE SOVIET FORCES ALSO FORM A
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PART OF THE INTEGRATED DEFENSES OF THE WARSAW TREATY. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO OBLIGATIONS WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE MULTILATERAL CHARACTER OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH, ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY, PARTICIPANTS WERE SOVEREIGN STATES WHICH WERE BOTH CAPABLE AND OBLIGATED, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EXISTING NORMS, OF UNDERTAKING INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS.

22. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID, THUS, THE APPROACH OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO THE QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL FORCE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES OTHER THAN THE USSR AND THE USA, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A COLLECTIVE LEVELS PROPOSED BY THE WEST AS IT HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD IN THE EAST'S NEW PROPOSALS, CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR THE WORKING OUT OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE REDUCTIONS ISSUE.

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23. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP,

FRG REP SAID HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 ON WHICH WESTERN REPS HAD SOME QUESTIONS. FRG REP SAID HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS, WESTERN REPS ASSUMED FROM EASTERN COMMENTS IN THE LAST SESSION THAT THE METHOD USED BY THE EAST TO COMPUTE THE RESPECTIVE REDUCTIONS OF 91,000 AND 105,000 WHICH IT NOW PROPOSED WAS AS FOLLOWS: TO USE AS A STARTING POINT EACH SIDE'S DATA ON ITS TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TO COMPUTE REDUCTIONS FROM THAT POINT TO THE FIGURE OF 700,000 MEN. WAS THIS A CORRECT DESCRIPTION?

24. TARASOV RESPONDED THAT THE FRG REPS UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD PROCEED FROM THIS STARTING POINT. NAMELY, THEY PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCE NUMBER BY THAT NUMBER BY WHICH ITS FORCES EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN. AS WAS KNOWN, THE
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EASTERN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE--AND THE POSITION SET FORTH IN THE EAST'S PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE WAS SIMILAR TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION--PROVIDED THAT SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT NOT BY THE WARSAW AND NATO COUNTRIES TAKEN AS A SINGLE ENTITY, BUT BY EACH STATE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF AND IN APPROXIMATE PROPORTION TO ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. BESIDES, BEFORE SIGNING A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THERE WOULD NATURALLY BE TAKEN THE FIGURES FOR THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THE SIDES AS OF THE PERIOD OF SIGNING THE AGREEMENT.

25. FRG REPS ASKED AS HIS SECOND QUESTION, IN THE FIRST SECTION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, EAST HAD INDICATED THAT THE 900,000 FIGURE WAS INTENDED TO COVER THE TOTAL OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

A. IN THIS REGARD, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE, AS UNDER THE WESTERN SCHEME, FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO EXCEED 200,000 IF THE TOTAL OF AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DID NOT EXCEED 900,000?

26. TARASOV SAID, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSALS OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS OF 8 JUNE, IT WAS IMPLIED THAT FOR THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER WHICH, ACCORDING TO THESE PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS, AN UPPER MAXIMUM LEVEL OF 200,000 MEN WOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

27. FRG REP SAID THIS MEANT THAT THE UPPER LEVEL COULD NOT EXCEED A TOTAL OF 900,000 GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL AND THAT THE TOTAL FIGURE FOR 700,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL COULD ALSO NOT BE EXCEEDED.

28. TARASOV SAID, YES, THIS UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT. THE EAST PROCEEDED FROM THE FOLLOWING: WHILE ESTABLISHING EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF 900,000 MEN FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED

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FORCES, INCLUDING 700,000 MEN FOR GROUND FORCES, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THUS ENVISAGED THAT BOTH SIDES, FOLLOWING THE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE MORE THAN 700,000 MEN IN GROUND FORCES, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE MORE THAN 200,000 MEN IN AIR FORCES.

29. FRG REP ASKED WHETHER IT WAS A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE 200,000 FIGURE FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE EAST'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE COLLECTIVE LIMITATION FOR EACH SIDE. TARASOV REPLIED YES, NATURALLY.

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30. FRG REP SAID HIS THIRD QUESTION WAS UNDER THE HEADING OF GENERAL PROVISIONS. EASTERN REPS STATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THE OVERALL QUANTITY OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS AND UNITS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION. TARASOV REPLIED THAT THIS PROVISION ENVISAGED THAT, FOLLOWING THE REDUCTIONS BY STATES OF CERTAIN TYPES OF FORMATIONS, UNITS AND

SUBUNITS, THEIR RESIDUAL QUANTITY SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED EITHER THROUGH CARRYING OUT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTING NUMERICAL STRENGTH OR THROUGH AN INTRODUCTION INTO THE REDUCTION AREA OF NEW FORMATIONS, UNITS, OR SUBUNITS OF THIS TYPE. NATURALLY, THIS PROVISION WOULD NOT COVER OTHER FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.

31. FRG REP SAID THUS THIS MEANT THE PROPOSED LIMITATIONS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO LIMITATION UNITS OF THE TYPE ACTUALLY REDUCED
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AND WOULD NOT APPLY TO ALL FORMATIONS AND UNITS.

32. TARASOV SAID YES. IF FOR EXAMPLE, ANY STATE SHOULD REDUCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT ITS GROUND FORCES BY DIVISIONS, THEN IT SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE QUANTITY OR NUMBER OF DIVISIONS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, ANOTHER STATE SHOULD REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES BY REGIMENTS, OR BATTALIONS, IT SHOULD CORRESPONDINGLY NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ITS REGIMENTS OR BATTALIONS.

33. FRG REP SAID, THEREFORE, THIS LIMITATION APPLIED TO ALL REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS REDUCED, RATHER THAN TO PARTICULAR UNITS OF THE TYPE REDUCED. IN THAT CASE, FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK WHAT SIZE UNITS WOULD LIMITED? WAS HE CORRECT IN UNDERSTANDING FROM TARASOV'S REMARKS THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE SIZE OF THE UNITS SPECIFIED IN THE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. TARASOV APPEARED TO AGREE.

34. FRG REP SAID THE SECOND PART OF HIS QUESTION WAS WHETHER SUCH LIMITATIONS WOULD ALSO APPLY TO SUBUNITS. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS FORESAW REDUCTIONS BY SUBUNITS. WOULD THESE BE LIMITED? TARASOV SAID HE WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION LATER.

35. US REP SAID ONE POINT WAS NOT CLEAR. TARASOV HAD JUST SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR LIMITATIONS OF A TYPE THAT, FOLLOWING THE REDUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF UNITS, THEIR RESIDUAL QUANTITY SHOULD NOT INCREASE. IF A STATE REDUCED TANK BATTALIONS, THEN THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF TANK BATTALIONS WOULD BE LIMITED. BUT IF IT DID NOT REDUCE ENGINEER BATTALIONS, THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. WAS THIS CORRECT?

36. TARASOV SAID HE CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION RELATED TO THE
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FRG REP'S QUESTION AND WOULD ANSWER IT SUBSEQUENTLY. FRG REP ASKED TARASOV TO BE SURE TO ANSWER WHETHER THE PROPOSED LIMITATIONS WOULD APPLY TO UNITS OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OR TO ALL UNITS OF A PARTICULAR SIZE.

37. FRG REP ASKED TARASOV DID THE PROPOSED LIMITATIONS APPLY TO THE FORCES OF EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SEPARATELY, OR TO THE FORCES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES AS A WHOLE?

38. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION LATER ALSO.

39. FRG REP THEN SAID HIS FOURTH QUESTION WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST STAGE, PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3. WESTERN REPS ASSUMED FROM EASTERN STATEMENTS THAT PHASE I ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS BY THE US WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS PROPOSED BY THE WEST AND THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED EITHER TO WITHDRAW OR LIMIT THE ARMAMENTS OF ITS WITHDRAWN UNITS OTHER THAN THE SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. WAS THIS CORRECT?

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40. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD ALSO ANSWER THIS QUESTION LATER.
FRG REP SAID HE HAD A RELATED QUESTION, WHAT DID THE EAST INTEND

TO DO WITH THE ARMAMENTS OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET UNITS OTHER THAN SOVIET TANKS AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY, COMBAT VEHICLES.

41. TARASOV SAID, IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE STAGE I SECTION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IT WAS PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE AND WITHDRAW TO ITS OWN TERRITORY 1,000 TANKS AND 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES.

42. FRG REP SAID APPARENTLY TARASOV HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD FRG

REP'S QUESTION. FRG REP REPEATED HIS QUESTION.

43. TARASOV SAID THE USE OF OTHER TYPES OF ARMAMENTS BESIDES THE SOVIET TANKS, AS WELL AS THE USE OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT WITH
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WHICH THE UNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION WERE EQUIPPED WOULD BE DETERMINED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE SOVIET SIDE. AS EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD THEM, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL SPECIFIED THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION AMONG ALL THE ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES, ONLY OF TANKS, THUS ENVISAGING THE SAME APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

44. FRG REP SAID TARASOV HAD JUST SAID IT WOULD BE UP TO THE DISCRETION OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WANTED TO DO WITH OTHER ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN SOVIET TANKS. HE ASSUMED THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO THE U.S. TARASOV SAID, IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, IT WAS STATED THAT FOLLOWING THE REDUCTIONS OF THE US ARMAMENTS, THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE QUANTITY OF PERSHING MISSILES, AND NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS. THEREFORE, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DID NOT PROVIDE FOR WITHDRAWAL OR LIMITATIONS OF OTHER US ARMAMENTS.

45. FRG REP SAID HIS FIFTH QUESTION WAS THAT WESTERN REPS WERE NOT CLEAR AS TO THE MEANING OF PARAGRAPH 9 OF SECTION 1 AS REGARDS THE ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE II.

A. EASTERN REPS STATED THAT THEY HAD TAKEN A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST.

B. THEY ALSO STATED THAT PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD, UNLESS OTHER WISE AGREED, BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OR PATTERN OF REDUCTION OF FORCES ESTABLISHED FOR THE USA AND THE USSR IN A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT.

C. COULD TARASOV INDICATE WHAT SPECIFIC TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE IN PHASE II IN ORDER TO BE QUOTE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FORCE REDUCTION
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METHOD ESTABLISHED FOR THE USA AND USSR IN A FIRST STAGE
AGREEMENT? UNQUOTE

46. TARASOV SAID THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER, THAT IS, THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, PROVIDED FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES BY ALL STATES BY MEANS OF THEIR REDUCTION BY UNITS, AND SUBUNITS, TOGETHER WITH THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH THEY WERE EQUIPPED. HOWEVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED THAT IN THE FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS, THE USSR AND US ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A PACKAGE, AND SHOULD BE CONFINED ONLY TO DEFINITE, AGREED TYPES OF ARMAMENTS SPECIFIED IN THIS PACKAGE. AS FAR AS THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USSR AND USA WAS CONCERNED, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT TO AGREE IN THE COURSE OF STAGE 2 NEGOTIATIONS ON A REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS OF THE KIND WHICH WAS ENVISAGED BY THE EAST'S APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE, THAT IS, TO AGREE ON THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS TOGETHER WITH THE COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH. IN ADDITION, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THAT UNLESS THE STAGE 2 AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS ESTABLISHED FOR THE USSR AND THE US IN THE STAGE 1 AGREEMENT. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD IN MIND THAT THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS OF THESE STATES COULD ALSO BE CARRIED OUT ON A PACKAGE DEAL BASIS. THAT IS, THAT SOME DEFINITELY AGREED TYPES OF ARMAMENTS COULD BE REDUCED. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT NOW PROVIDING FOR ANY SPECIFIC TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US ON BOTH SIDES IN THE SECOND STAGE.

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47 FRG REP SAID, BUT THE EAST'S PROPOSAL PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND US WOULD BE ABLE TO REVOKE THEIR PHASE I OBLIGATIONS IF THE US OR SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED THAT PHASE II REDUCTIONS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT WERE NOT CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REDUCTION METHOD OF STAGE 1. THIS RIGHT TO WITHDRAW WOULD PRESUMABLE BE PART OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS A NATURAL QUESTION, WHAT ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA WOULD THE EAST CONSIDER UNDER ITS PROPOSAL TO BE IN CONFORMITY WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS BY THE US OR NUCLEAR WARHEADS, PERSHING MISSILES AND F-4 AIRCRAFT? AND WHAT WOULD NOT BE IN CONFORMITY? AND WHAT WOULD BE THE CRITERIA FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM ITS PHASE I COMMITMENTS?

48. TARASOV SAID, THE EAST'S BASIC POSITION WAS THAT ALL STATES
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SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ACHIEVED AGREEMENT, ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS, TOGETHER WITH THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT THEY WERE EQUIPPED WITH. AS WAS KNOWN, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED TO DIVIDE THE REDUCTION PROCESS INTO TWO STAGES. MOREOVER, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE ANY KIND OF COMMITMENTS ON THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND STAGE. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW ACCEPTING THAT THE ISSUE OF THEIR ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BECOME A SUBJECT MATTER OF THE STAGE 2 NEGOTIATIONS. AS REGARDS THE REDUCTION OF FORCES, ALTHOUGH PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT ET AGREED UPON THE METHOD OF THEIR REDUCTION--THAT IS, EITHER THEY SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS AS THE WEST INSISTS OR INDIVIDUAL BASIS AS THE EAST INSISTED, PARTICIPANTS NEVERTHELESS ALREADY HAD AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD BE CARRIED OUT A REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES IN A FIXED TIME LIMIT AND IN THOSE AMOUNTS WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REACH THE AGREED LEVELS. AS FAR AS ARMAMENT REDUCTION IS CONCERNED, THOSE UNDERTAKEN TOGETHER WITH

THE US DEFINITE COMMITMENTS ON THE REDUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD STILL REMAIN COMPLETELY UNAWARE ABOUT WHICH TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WOULD BE REDUCED BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMMENSE IMPORTANCE OF THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS ON A MUTUAL BASIS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES, AND HAVING NO POSSIBILITY AS YET TO AGREE UPON SPECIFIC TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN COMPELLED TO INTRODUCE INTO THEIR PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 GENERAL CRITERIA WHICH WERE SET FORTH IN PARA 9. THESE CRITERIA WERE AS FOLLOWS: EITHER AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FOR THE WESTERN AND EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED, OR, IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED, THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN CONFORMITY

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WITH THE ARMAMENT REDUCTION METHOD ENVISAGED IN THE FIRST STAGE FOR THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS, TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN A PACKAGE DEAL.

49. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE WITH SOME QUESTIONS IN THE SAME AREA. UNDER THE FIRST STAGE IN PARA 9, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAST SENTENCE WAS STILL NOT CLEAR TO WESTERN REPS.

DID EASTERN REPS MEAN BY THIS LANGUAGE THAT THE US AND THE USSR WOULD BE ABLE TO REVOKE BOTH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED FOR THEIR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND THEIR OBLIGATION TO REDUCE FURTHER IN THE SECOND PHASE, MEANING THAT IN PRACTICE THERE WOULD BE NO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS AND THAT ALL FIRST PHASE OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING, IN THIS CASE, REDUCTIONS, WOULD BE NULLIFIED? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO PHASE I COMMITMENTS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR? OR DID THE EAST MEAN THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD STILL BE COMMITTED TO TAKE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE, BUT THAT THEY COULD REVOKE OTHER OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS?

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50. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY ANSWERED A SIMILAR QUESTION AND HAD TOLD WESTERN REPS THAT EASTERN REPS HAD IN MIND THE COMMITMENTS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED.

51. FRG REP ASKED DID THIS INCLUDE PHASE I COMMITMENTS FOR THE SECOND STAGE? WOULD THEY REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY SUCH REVOCATION?

52. TARASOV SAID THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES WERE CLOSELY INTERRELATED. IF EASTERN REPS WOULD CONSIDER AS UNSATISFACTORY THE REDUCTIONS WHICH THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE GOING TO UNDERTAKE IN THE SECOND STAGE, THEN THEY WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE EITHER.

53. FRG REP SAID THIS MEANT IN PRACTICE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS AND THAT ALL FIRST PHASE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE NULLIFIED AND THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD RETURN TO THE SECRET

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STARTING POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. TARASOV SAID THIS WAS CORRECT.

54. FRG REP SAID WHAT CRITERIA WOULD BE APPLIED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT A GIVEN "METHOD WERE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT ENVISATED FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA"? WOULD THIS BE DETERMINED UNILATERALLY?

55. TARASOV SAID THE ONLY CRITERION WHICH COULD AT PRESENT BE VISUALIZED FOR THE REDUCTION IN THE SECOND STAGE MIGHT BE THE FOLLOWING: (1) REDUCTION OF FORCES BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS, (2) PARTICIPATION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THESE TWO CONDITIONS HAD BEEN USED AS A BASIS FOR THE

FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES OF THE USA AND THE USSR. SIMILAR BUT NOT YET SPECIFICALLY DETERMINED CONDITIONS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US. IF THE METHOD OF THEIR ARMED FORCES REDUCTION SHOULD CONSIDERABLY DIFFER FROM THE METHOD OF REDUCTION UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION AND US, ONLY IN THIS CASE WOULD THERE BE ENVISAGED FOR THE US AND THE USSR A POSSIBILITY TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES FREED FROM THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT.

56. FRG REP ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR US WOULD DETERMINE AUTONOMOUSLY FOR ITSELF AND UNILATERALLY WHETHER THE REDUCTION METHOD IN THE SECOND STAGE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERED FROM THAT USED IN THE FIRST STAGE OR NOT?

57. TARASOV SAID THE ANSWER WAS YES. THE EAST'S PROPOSAL ENVISAGED FOR THE US A POSSIBILITY TO CONSIDER ITSELF FREED FROM THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE FIRST STAGE IN THE EVENT IT SHOULD CONSIDER THAT ALL OTHER WARSAW TREATY PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USSR WERE GOING TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTIONS OF THEIR FORCES

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AND ARMAMENTS IN SUCH AN ORDER (COMMENT: PATTERN) WHICH CONSIDERABLY DIFFERED FROM THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE US (SIC). A SIMILAR POSSIBILITY WAS PROVIDED FOR THE USSR.

58. TARASOV SAID HE WISHED TO ADD THAT FOLLOWING THE STAGE 1 AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION AND US WOULD NOT GO OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THEY WOULD RETAIN THEIR FULL RIGHTS AS PARTICIPANTS. THIS MEANT THAT THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSION AND ISSUES OF FORCE REDUCTIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND STAGE. THIS MEANT THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO EXPRESS THEIR POINT OF VIEW ABOUT SPECIFIC CRITERIA WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A BASIS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE.

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NRC-05 DOE-15 SOE-02 MCE-00 /152 W

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O P 131954Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2946
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNRM SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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59. US REP SAID ONE POINT WAS NOT CLEAR IN THESE REMARKS.
TARASOV HAD SAID THAT A SIMILAR POSSIBILITY WAS PROVIDED
FOR THE US. FOLLOWING FROM WHAT TARASOV HAD SAID ABOUT THE US,
THE EAST'S PROPOSALS APPARENTLY ENVISATED THE POSSIBILITY FOR
THE SOVIET UNION TO CONSIDER ITSELF FREED FROM STAGE 1
OBLIGATIONS IF THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED OTHER WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS WERE REDUCING IN A MANNER WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE
METHOD OF THE SOVIET UNION.

60. TARASOV SAID THE ANSWER TO THIS WAS YES.

61. US DEP REP ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THESE NON-US
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE BY UNITS
AND TO REDUCE TANKS AS THEIR ARMAMENTS AS THE USSR WOULD HAVE
DONE IN PHASE I.

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62. TARASOV SAID HE HAD ALREADY ANSWERED A SIMILAR QUESTION
IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION. AT THAT POINT, HE HAD SAID THAT
COMMITMENTS BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION IN A SECOND STAGE
AGREEMENT CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EAST'S PROPOSALS
WOULD BE OF THE SAME TYPE. THIS WAS WHY IT WOULD BE NATURAL THAT
IN THE METHODS OF REDUCTIONS USED BY BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE US FORCES SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NATURALLY, EASTERN
PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT PROPOSE THAT CANADA OR LUXEMBOURG SHOULD
REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY DIVISIONS OR BRIGADES. ALSO
EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT REQUIRE COUNTRIES WHICH DID
NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HOWEVER,
SUCH A PROVISION WOULD GIVE AN ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO ELABORATION

ON REACHING A STAGE 2 AGREEMENT.

63. US DEP REP SAID DID THIS MEAN THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WHEN THEY HAD THEM OR TANKS WHEN THEY DID NOT HAVE THEM?

64. TARASOV SAID NO, THE EAST WAS NOT PROPOSING ANY SPECIFIC REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS EITHER BY WESTERN OR EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN FOR THE US AND SOVIET UNION. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT THESE PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DETERMINE THEMSELVES--AND THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NATURALLY BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. AND IF SUCH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WAS FOUND, THEN NO ISSUE OF FREEING THE US OR THE SOVIET UNION FROM THEIR PHASE I OBLIGATIONS WOULD ARISE. THE EAST'S PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND US IN THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE VALID IN THE EVENT THAT AS A RESULT OF SECOND STAGE

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NEGOTIATIONS, A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE REACHED.

65. FRG REP SAID THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW 1,000 "TANKS" IN PHASE I. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF "MAIN BATTLE TANKS". WAS THIS THE TYPE OF TANK WHICH THE EAST PROPOSED TO WITHDRAW?

66. TARASOV SAID YES.

67 FRG REP SAID HIS EIGHTH QUESTION WAS WITH REGARD TO STAGE 1, PARA 8, SECOND SUBPARAGRAPH, DID THIS PROVISION MEAN THAT NO STATE IN THE SAME GROUPING COULD INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FORCES REDUCED UNILATERALLY BY ITS ALLIES AFTER THE REDUCTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT?

68. TARASOV SAID YES, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT AFTER THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE, NO STATE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT IN GENERAL TO INCREASE ITS ARMED FORCES MANPOWER. AS EASTERN PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTOOD IT, A SIMILAR PROVISION WAS ALSO ENVISAGED BY THE WEST. THE EASTERN PROVISION CONTAINED IN PARA 8 SUBPARAGRAPH 2 DEALT WITH THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER COMPLETION OF BOTH STAGE 1 AND STAGE 2 REDUCTIONS.

69 FRG REP SAID, THEN HIS INTERPRETATION WAS CORRECT THAT

THE 50 PERCENT CONCEPT REFERRED TO THE TOTAL UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF ALLIES ON ONE SIDE FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS. TARASOV SAID THIS WAS RIGHT.

70. FRG REP THEN ASKED, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROVISION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IN STAGE 1, PARA 8 RELATING TO A STATE'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATE FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY ONE OF ITS ALLIES, EASTERN REPS STATED THAT: " IN THE CASE OF A POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES,
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NO OTHER STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE REDUCTION AND BELONGING TO THE SAME GROUPING WOULD BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED BY ITS ALLIES, AND MUST NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AS A RESULT OF SUCH AN INCREASE, REESTABLISH OR, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, EXCEED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION." APART FROM THE "50 PERCENT OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS" RULE, WESTERN REPS INTERPRETED THIS LANGUAGE TO MEAN, THAT, PROVIDING THAT THE OVERALL COLLECTIVE CEILING WAS MAINTAINED, THEORETICALLY A STATE COULD INCREASE ITS MANPOWER PROVIDING THAT STATE'S NUMERICAL STRENGTH DID NOT REACH OR EXCEED ITS PREREDUCTION LEVEL. WHAT THIS CORRECT?

71. TARASOV SAID ONLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE AGREED CEILING LEVELS TO COMPENSATE FOR REDUCTIONS BY ONE OR MORE ALLIES OF ITS POLITICAL GROUPING.

72. FRG REP THEN ASKED, ALSO WITH REGARD TO STAGE 1, PARA 8, SECOND SUBPARAGRAPH, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN CASE THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FORCES REDUCED UNILATERALLY BY SOME MEMBERS OF ONE GROUP OF ALLIES AFTER THE ENTRY INTO EFFECT OF AN AGREEMENT WERE TO EXCEED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH ITS OTHER ALLIES WOULD BE PERMITTED TO COMPENSATE FOR?

73. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED SUCH A SITUATION TO BE A PURELY HYPOTHETICAL ONE. SINCE THE REDUCTIONS PROVIDED FOR BOTH ACCORDING TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AND TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE SUBSTANTIAL ONES, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY IN CONDITIONS OF A NORMAL SITUATION IN EUROPE THAT THE BALANCE OF RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES OF STATES WITHIN ONE AND THE SAME MILITARY/POLITICAL GROUPING WOULD BE FRUSTRATED. THIS WAS WHY IN THE EAST'S PROPOSALS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD DELIBERATELY NOT
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PROVIDED AN ANSWER

TO SUCH A QUESTION. HOWEVER, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DID TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF CERTAIN PARTIAL CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARMED FORCES OF STATES WITHIN A GIVEN GROUPING. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMMENTS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED BY THE WESTERN SIDE REGARDING THE FACT THAT IN THE CASE OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY ONE OR SEVERAL STATES OF SOME PART OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, THE EQUALITY OF COMMON LEVELS WOULD BE FRUSTRATED, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS NOW ACCEPTED THAT IN SUCH CASES, REDUCTIONS UNILATERALLY UNDERTAKEN BY ONE OR SEVERAL STATES COULD BE COMPENSATED FOR BY ONE OR SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL. IN SUCH AN EVENT, SUCH COMPENSATION SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED MORE OR LESS EVENLY AND IT WAS IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THE 50 PERCENT RULE.

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ACTION ACDA-12

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74. FRG REP SAID HIS QUESTION HAD REFERRED TO A POSSIBILITY WHICH DID EXIST; THAT UNDER THE SYSTEM PROPOSED BY THE EAST IF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY ONE MEMBER OF A GROUP OR IF MORE THAN ONE MEMBER OF A GROUP REDUCES UNILATERALLY THE AMOUNT WHICH COULD BE COMPENSATED FOR WAS LIMITED AND FROM A CERTAIN POINT ON, A GROUP WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REACH OR MAINTAIN A LIMITATION OF 700,000 MEN. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE BUNDESWEHR

SHOULD REDUCE UNILATERALLY 70,000 MEN, THEN UNDER THE EASTERN SYSTEM IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECONSTITUTE THE OVERALL LEVEL. SHUSTOV SAID AT 92,000 IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.

75. FRG REP SAID THE LARGER THE FORCE OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN ONE GROUP WERE REDUCED THEN THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR OTHER MEMBERS OF ITS GROUP TO MAKE UP FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY SUCH LARGER MEMBERS.

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76. TARASOV SAID IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSED REDUCTION SCHEME NEEDED FOR ESTABLISHING EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS, THE WESTERN STATES SHOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY 91,000 MEN. THEREFORE, IN THE EVENT THAT ONE OF THE WESTERN STATES REDUCED ITS FORCES BY 70,000, OTHER STATES PARTICIPATING IN THIS GROUPING WOULD IN THE SAME GROUPING HAVE THE POSSIBILITY TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES BY 70,000 WITHOUT EXCEEDING THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES AFTER REDUCTIONS.

77. FRG AND BELGIAN REP SAID THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE AND TARASOV HAD ENGAGED IN BAD MATHEMATICS. TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN REPS HAD NOT ACTUALLY CARRIED THROUGH THIS TYPE OF CALCULATION AND THE POSSIBLE EXAMPLE HE CITED MIGHT NOT CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. BUT IF SUCH DRAMATIC REDUCTION OF THE BUNDESWEHR SHOULD TAKE PLACE, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION AMONG THE NEGOTIATING PARTICIPANTS AS THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE TO MAINTAIN THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES.

78. FRG REP ASKED IF THE EASTERN REPS WOULD EXPLAIN WHAT THEY MEANT IN SUBPARAGRAPH 3 OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF PHASE I BY THE PHRASE QUOTE MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACETIME UNQUOTE. WHAT WERE SUCH POSITIONS?

79. TARASOV REPLIED WHEN EASTERN REPS SAID THAT NONE OF THE STATES SHOULD INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ITS ARMIES BY MEANS OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS FILLED IN PEACETIME BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS DID NOT MEAN ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN GENERAL BUT ONLY THOSE PERSONNEL FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS AND PERFORMING PURELY PROFESSIONAL MILITARY FUNCTIONS. TO CLARIFY, FOR EXAMPLE, EASTERN REPS COULD CITE THOSE MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE FRG WHICH ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT OF THE FRG REP COULD BE FILLED IN PEACETIME BOTH BY

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CIVILIANS AND BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WHICH ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS OF THE WESTERN SIDE HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FIGURES FOR WESTERN MILITARY MANPOWER.

80. FRG REP SAID THERE IS A LACK OF LOGIC HERE. IF THESE POSITIONS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN WESTERN FIGURES, WHAT NECESSITY WAS THERE FOR A SPECIFIC LIMITATION?

81. TARASOV SAID THAT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE EMPLOYED PERFORMING FUNCTIONS SERVING MILITARY UNITS, AND ALSO IN ORDER TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE FUTURE, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT THE LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF SUCH POSITIONS WAS QUITE A PROPER ONE. BESIDES, WHILE AT PRESENT ACCORDING TO WESTERN STATEMENTS CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE FRG ARMY WERE COUNTED IN THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES ONE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT AFTER COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS, IN SOME OTHER ARMIES THERE WOULD BE INTRODUCED MILITARY POSITIONS FILLED IN PEACETIME BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO COULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN FIGURES FOR THE OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER.

82. FRG REP SAID THESE WERE ALL THE QUESTIONS HE HAD FOR THE TIME BEING.

83. TARASOV SAID EAST HAS PREPARED ANSWERS TO THE MAJOR PART OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE WEST EARLIER ON EASTERN DATA. JUDGING BY THE ADVANCED HOUR (1400 HOURS) IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GIVE THESE ANSWERS NEXT TIME.

84. US REP SAID HE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO HAND OVER THE WESTERN ANSWERS AND QUESTIONS IF TARASOV WOULD DO SO. TARASOV AGREED TO SUPPLY EASTERN REPLIES ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, AFTER THE EASTERN TRANSLATION HAD BEEN CHECKED FURTHER. RESOR

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